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1. Introduction 
Advances in communication technologies coupled with reductions in 
transportation costs have increased the scope of global trade over the past 100 years.  
Recently global trade has included the export of used durable goods from developed to 
less developed economies.  For example, about 10.2 million used computers – roughly 
80% of all used computers collected from firms and households in the United States - 
were exported to Asia in 2002 (Puckett and Smith, 2002).  Roughly one-fourth of all 
used computers collected from firms and households in Japan were exported to 
developing nations in 2004 – up from just 8% in 2000 (Yoshida et al., 2009).  About 
2.5 million used cars and trucks were exported from the United States to Mexico 
between 2005 and 2008 (Davis and Kahn, 2008). 
Exporting used durable goods to developing economies for further consumption, 
a concept we call “global reuse”, provides utility to consumers in developing countries 
but can have negative social consequences if the resulting waste contains toxic 
substances and developing nations lack appropriate disposal methods.  The cathode ray 
tubes of televisions and personal computers, for example, contain large amounts of lead 
oxide and cadmium – substances harmful to the natural environment and human health.  
The circuit boards of computers and cell phones also contain lead and cadmium.  
 2 
Modern flat-screen panel monitors contain mercury, another harmful pollutant 
potentially damaging to human organs.
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Thus the waste from these durable goods can be hazardous, and advanced 
disposal techniques can be necessary to mitigate external effects of disposal.  Such 
disposal technologies are often available in developed countries.  But less developed 
importing countries such as China, Philipine, India, Pakistan, Mexico or Nigeria rarely 
possess the technologies, policies, and enforcement infrastructures necessary to control 
external disposal costs.  In Guiyu, China, for example, broken CRTs are regularly 
dumped on open land or pushed into rivers (Puckett and Smith, 2002).  In Nigeria, 
used televisions and computers are used to fill swamps (Puckett, 2005). 
This paper develops a two-country model to solve for optimal taxes and 
subsidies necessary in an economy with global reuse.  The model, we believe, is easy 
to understand and replicate.  Results are intuitive and relevant to policy formation.  In 
the baseline case, developed in Section 3 of this paper, both the developed and 
developing economies are able to initiate tax policies to internalize the social costs of 
                                                 
1
 Inorganic mercury mixed with water is transformed to methylated mercury.  Methylated mercury 
easily accumulates in living organisms and concentrates through the food chain.  Cadmium compounds 
accumulate in the human body, particularly the kidneys, and have irreversible consequences for human 
health, (Puckett and Smith, 2002).  Each cathrode ray tube contains about 2kg of lead, enough to 
damage human central and peripheral nerves, which can have a deleterious effect on the growth and 
development of children. Lead is also an endocrine disruptor. Yoshida (2002) 
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waste disposal.  Unsurprisingly, optimal policy requires each disposal tax be set equal 
to the external marginal cost within each country.  The model is then extended in 
Section 4 to the more interesting case where only the developed nation can tax waste.  
Under this assumption, and when coupled with a disposal tax in the developed country, 
the government of the developing country can still achieve the global Pareto Optimum 
by either taxing the importation of the used durable good or subsidizing consumer 
return of durable waste for eventual disposal back in the developed country.  The 
model in Section 5 considers the case when policy instruments are unavailable to the 
developing country.  The global Pareto Optimum is obtained by reducing the disposal 
tax in the developed country to a level below their external marginal cost of disposal.  
Before introducing the model, the next section of this paper summarizes the literature 
on durable goods and the international market for waste. 
 
2. The Literature 
In a closed economy, several papers have demonstrated that the optimal policy 
for internalizing the social costs of waste disposal is a tax on disposal set equal to the 
external marginal cost of disposal (beginning with Wertz, 1976).  Where illegal 
dumping is problematic, the disposal tax is replaced by a subsidy to recycling coupled 
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with a tax on consumption – a deposit refund program (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995).  
Shinkuma (2007) extends the waste policy literature for a closed-economy to the case of 
durable goods by demonstrating that advanced disposal fees lead to inefficient choices 
between reuse and disposal. 
The solid waste literature on open economies focuses almost entirely on the 
international transfer of pure waste, rather than on waste embedded in used goods.  
Copeland (1991) argues that eliminating trans-national shipments of waste can improve 
welfare if importing governments do not adequately regulate waste disposal or if such 
regulations cause illegal dumping in those countries.  For the case of durable goods, 
banning international trade may not be efficient if the additional value consumers place 
on imported used durable goods exceeds the difference in external costs of disposal 
between the importing and exporting country.  Rauscher (2001) also examines the 
international trade in hazardous waste. 
A collection of other papers examines the strategic use of waste taxes to alter 
trade patterns.  For example, Krutilla (1991) suggests national governments will set 
waste taxes in exporting industries to levels above the external cost of disposal to 
reduce supply and therefore improve international terms of trade.  Waste taxes in 
importing industries, on the other hand, are set below external costs to help these 
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industries compete globally.  Alternatively, Kennedy (1994) argues that where 
competition is imperfect, governments could (1) reduce domestic disposal taxes to 
improve rents to exporting industries while at the same time (2) increase domestic 
disposal taxes to encourage the transfer of waste to other countries.  The first effect is 
found to outweigh the second effect if the external costs of waste disposal do not extend 
beyond a nation’s borders.  Cassing and Kuhn (2003) find that importing countries 
levy waste taxes below the external marginal cost of disposal and below waste taxes in 
exporting countries to correct for the market inefficiency caused by imperfect 
competition in exporting countries. Barrett (1994) and Simpson (1995) also examine the 
use of environmental waste taxes as substitutes for trade taxes.  Although we do not 
model strategic trade behavior, the paper contributes to this literature by considering the 
substitutability of waste and trade taxes for reaching global efficiency. 
Research into closed economies with durable goods goes back at least as far as 
Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994).  More recently, Thomas (2003) focuses on the 
relationship between material consumption and transaction costs of second-hand 
markets and Yokoo (2010) examines the impact of reuse activity on consumer welfare.  
Shinkuma (2009) is the first to distinguish durable goods from non-durable goods in the 
context of optimal waste policy in a global setting and finds that an advanced disposal 
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fee is globally inefficient. Our study expands upon the work of Shinkuma (2009) by 
considering policy options beyond a producer responsibility measure. 
 
3. Waste Taxes Available to Both Countries (t
A
w>0, t
B
w>0) 
This section develops a baseline model where both a developed and developing 
country can tax waste.  This model expands upon a domestic waste model of Fullerton 
and Kinnaman (1995), Fullerton and Wu (1998), and Kinnaman (2010).  The model 
does not attempt to explain why one country is more economically developed than the 
other, but assumes incomes and production technologies in each country are determined 
exogenously.  
Assume an open economy is comprised of two countries.  Country A is 
endowed with a technology to produce durable goods such as televisions, computers, or 
automobiles.  The durable good is initially consumed only in Country A, as Country B 
is assumed to not possess the technology to produce the durable good, nor do consumers 
have incomes sufficient to import new durable goods from Country A.  Instead the 
consumers of Country B import used durable goods from Country A.   
After consuming the durable good (with quantity d), consumers in Country A 
either dispose the good as waste in Country A (w
A
) or export the good to Country B for 
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reuse (e).  Thus d = w
A
 + e (where w
A
, e  0).  Once the used durable good has been 
consumed in Country B, it becomes waste to be disposed in Country B (w
B
), thus e = 
w
B
.  Assume all of this consumption and disposal activity occurs within a single time 
period.  Within the context of a dynamic model, the conditions d = e + w
A
 and e = w
B
 
could describe a steady state.
2
 
Assume country A is comprised of n identical consumers each with utility (U
A
) 
defined over their own consumption of the durable good (d) and the total quantity of 
waste disposed in Country A (nw
A
), 
(1)   U
A
 = U
A
(d, nw
A
),  where Ud > 0 and Uw < 0. 
Assume a global economic resource such as capital or energy (k) constitutes 
the only input into five production processes.  First, the economic resource (with 
quantity k
d
) can be employed to produce the durable good (d) in Country A according to 
the production function, 
(2)   d = f(k
d), where f’ > 0.   
Second, the economic resource (k
w
) can be used to collect and dispose the used durable 
good as waste in Country A (w
A
) according to the production function 
(3)   w
A
 = g(k
w
), where g’ > 0. 
                                                 
2
 See Yokoo (2010) for theoretical treatment of durable good consumption in a dynamic model. 
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Third, transporting the used durable good from Country A to Country B requires the 
economic resource (k
e
) according to e = e(k
e
).   This function can be inverted to solve 
for k
e
, 
(4)   k
e
 = k
e
(e), where k
e’>0. 
 In Country B, the representative consumer gains utility (U
B
) from consuming 
the imported used durable good (e), consuming a non-durable good (c), and the 
aggregate quantity of waste resulting from used durable goods (mw
B
, where m denotes 
the number of identical consumers in Country B and recall that e = w
B
) 
(5)  U
B
 = U
B
(e, c, mw
B
), where U
B
e > 0, U
B
c > 0, and U
B
w < 0. 
The non-durable good (c) is produced in Country B using the same global 
economic resource available to Country A above (with quantity k
c
, the fourth use of the 
resource) according to the production function, 
(6)   c = h(k
c), where h’>0. 
Assume this non-durable good does not generate waste sufficient to affect the utility of 
the consumers of Country B.  Examples of such a good could include agricultural 
products, local services, or leisure.
 
Waste resulting from the used durable good consumed in Country B is 
processed and disposed using the economic resource (k
b
) according to, 
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(7)   w
B
 = b(k
b), where b’>0. 
Finally, assume the total quantity of the global economic resource available to the five 
production processes is k and is fully employed,  
(8)   k = k
d
 + k
w
 + k
e
 +k
c
 + k
b
. 
 
Social Efficiency 
To achieve the Pareto Optimal allocation of the economic resource across the 
five production processes, a social planner maximizes the utility of the representative 
consumer in Country A subject to holding the utility of the representative consumer in 
Country B constant at BU .  The social planner is constrained by the materials balance 
conditions (d = e + w and e = w
B
), the five production functions (in 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7), 
and the resource constraint given in (8).  Upon substitution, the problem reduces to 
choosing k
w
, k
b
, and k
d
 to maximize the Lagrange function, 
L = UA{g(kw)+b(kb), ng(kw)} 
+ 1[
BU - U
B
 {h[ k - k
d – kw - ke(b(kb)) - kb], b(kb), mb(kb)}] 
           + 2[f(k
d
) - g(k
w
) - b(k
b
)] 
where 1 and 2 are Lagrange multipliers.  The latter represents the marginal utility of 
producing an additional unit of the durable good.  The first-order conditions are  
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(9a)  Lkw: U
A
dg’ + nU
A
wg’ = 1[-U
B
ch’] + 2[g’] 
(9b)  Lkb:  U
A
db’ = 1[-U
B
ch’k
e’b’ -UBch’ + U
B
eb’ + mU
B
wb’] + 2[b’] 
(9c)  Lkd: 2[f’] = 1[-U
B
ch’] 
Divide (9a) through by g’, divide (9b) through by b’, and solve (9c) for 1 and substitute 
into (9a) and (9b) to eliminate 1. We are left with, 
(10a)  U
A
d/2 = f’/g’ + 1 - nU
A
w/2 
(10b)  U
A
d/2 = f’k
e’ + f’/b’ - UBef’/U
B
ch’ - mU
B
wf’/U
B
ch’ + 1 
These two equations summarize the Pareto Optimal allocation of the economic 
resources across the five uses in the economy.  These conditions will be compared to 
those of the competitive equilibrium to determine optimal tax rates. 
 
Competitive Equilibrium 
Assume a disposal tax is available to the governments of both countries (t
A
w 
and t
B
w).  Assume a representative consumer in Country A faces prices pd = 1 (the 
numeraire) to purchase the durable good, p
A
w to dispose the resulting waste from the 
durable good in Country A, and receives pe for each unit of the used durable good 
exported to Country B.  Assume the consumer must also pay pk for the economic 
resource necessary to employ the technology in (4) to prepare and transport the used 
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durable good to Country B.
3
  These prices give rise to the consumer’s budget 
constraint, 
 M
A
 = d + p
A
wwA + pkk
e
(e) - pee, 
where MA denotes an exogenously determined level of consumer income.  The 
representative consumer maximizes utility (1) subject to the above budget constraint 
and the materials balance constraint d = w
A
 + e.  Because the number of consumers is 
large (n), the representative consumer considers its own contribution to the overall 
waste externality to be zero.  The aggregate quantity of waste (nw
A
) is therefore 
exogenous to the representative consumer. The consumer chooses w
A
 and e to 
maximize the Lagrange function, 
L = UA(wA + e, Awn ) + ∂A[MA - (wA + e) - pAww
A
 - pkk
e
(e) + pee] 
where ∂A, the Lagrange multiplier, denotes the marginal utility of income.  The 
first-order conditions are  
(11a)   LwA: U
A
d = ∂
A
[1+ p
A
w] 
(11b)   Le: U
A
d = ∂
A
[1 + pkk
e’ - pe]. 
The representative consumer purchases the durable good to the point that the marginal 
                                                 
3
 The assumption that consumers employ the technology in (4) to export the used durable good is made 
purely out of convenience.  An export firm could be added to the model that employs the same 
technology and charges a price to the consumer for this service.  Optimal taxes defined below would not 
change. 
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utility of consumption is equal to the price of durable good plus the overall cost of each 
of the two disposal options.  The utility-maximizing consumer will choose between 
domestic disposal and export for global reuse such that p
A
w = pkk
e’ - pe.   
Assume a representative competitive firm utilizes the production technology 
defined in (2) to produce the durable good.  This firm chooses the quantity of the 
economic resource to employ (k
d
) to maximize profit , π = f(kd) - pkk
d
. 
Profit is maximized when 
(12)    f’= pk 
Assume a representative competitive firm collects and disposes waste in 
Country A by employing the economic resource (k
w
) and the technology given in (3).  
This firm also pays a tax of t
A
w on each unit of waste disposed.  The firm chooses the 
quantity of the economic resource (k
w
) to maximize profit, π = (pAw - t
A
w)g(k
w
) - pkk
w
.  
Profit is maximized when 
(13)   p
A
w = pk/g’ + t
A
w. 
The representative consumer in Country B maximizes utility (5) subject to e = 
w
B
 (all imported used durable goods are disposed in Country B) and the budget 
constraint, M
B
 = pee + pcc + p
B
ww
B
, where pc is price of the non-durable good and once 
again pe is the price of the used durable good imported from Country A.  The 
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consumer also pays a price of p
B
w to dispose the waste from the durable good.  
Because the number of consumers in Country B is large (at m), the representative 
consumer considers the aggregate quantity of used durable goods disposed in Country B 
(mw
B
) to be exogenous.  The Lagrange function for this constrained 
utility-maximization problem is 
L = UB(wB, c, Bwm ) + δB[MB - pew
B
 - pcc - p
B
ww
B
]. 
The first-order conditions for utility maximization are 
   Lwb:  U
B
e = δ
B
[pe + p
B
w] 
(14)   Lc: U
B
c = δ
B
[pc], 
which can be simplified to the single condition 
(15)   U
B
e/U
B
c = (pe + p
B
w)/pc. 
The competitive firm in country B uses the technology in (6) to produce the 
non-durable good to maximize profit, π = pch(k
c
) - pkk
c
, by choosing k
c
 such that  
(16)   pc = pk/h’. 
Finally a competitive firm in Country B employs the disposal technology in (7) 
to dispose waste from the durable good in Country.  In this baseline case the 
government of Country B can tax this waste to encourage waste producers to internalize 
the social costs of disposal.  Profit π = (pBw - t
B
w)b(k
b
) - pkk
b
 is maximized when 
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(17)   p
B
w = pk/b’+ t
B
w. 
Substitute (16), (17), and (12) into (15) to eliminate pc, p
B
w, and pk.  Solve the resulting 
equation for pe and substitute into (11b) to eliminate pe.  Then substitute (13) into (11a) 
to eliminate p
A
w and substitute (12) into (11a) and (11b) to eliminate pk.  We are left 
with 
(18a)  U
A
d/∂
A
 = 1 + f’/g’ + tAw 
(18b)  U
A
d/∂
A
 = 1 + f’ke - UBef’/U
B
ch’ + f’/b’ + t
B
w 
These equations summarize the allocation of resources in a decentralized  
economy as a function of the two waste taxes.  Compare (18) with (10) and note that 
the Pareto Optimum can be achieved by the competitive equilibrium when tax rates are 
t
A
w = - nU
A
w/2 and t
B
w = - U
B
wf’/U
B
ch’.  Combining (14), (16), and (12) suggests f’ = 
U
B
ch’/δ
B
 allowing the optimal tax rates to be simplified to 
t
A
w = - nU
A
w/2   and  t
B
w = - mU
B
w/δ
B 
Controlling for a few changes in notations and a few other features of the 
model, this result is similar to Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995), who solve for the 
optimal tax in a closed economy.  A country sets a tax rate on waste disposal equal to 
the external marginal cost of waste disposal (nU
A
w and U
B
w, respectively).  The 
Lagrange multipliers convert the units of taxation from utiles to dollars. 
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 Notice that the optimal waste tax does not depend upon the durable nature of 
the exported good.  If consumers in Country B gain no utility from the imported 
material (U
B
e = 0), the optimal tax policy remains the same.  Thus, it makes little 
difference to formation of optimal policy whether computers and televisions are being 
exported as pure waste products or as used goods with additional consumptive value.  
That the international transfer of waste is treated differently by the policy community 
than the international transfer of goods embedded with waste is beyond the explanatory 
scope of the model. 
 
4. Waste not Taxed in Country B (t
B
w=0) 
Consider the same economy as described above with the added assumption that 
the government of Country B is unable to tax waste disposal.  Perhaps the economy 
lacks the necessary technology (scales for weighing trucks entering and exiting 
landfills, for example) or the government lacks the resources to discourage illegal 
dumping that might arise with the implementation of a waste tax (Copeland, 1991).  
This section explores alternative tax instruments available to government of Country B 
for achieving the Pareto Optimal allocation of the economic resource when waste is 
untaxed.  The first is a tax on imports of the used durable good.  The second is a 
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subsidy paid for the return of waste from the used durable good back to County A. 
 
An Import Tax on the Used Durable Good (t
A
w>0, t
B
w=0, tm>0) 
Assume that the government in Country B can levy a tax (tm) on each unit of the 
used durable good imported from Country A.  The consumer’s budget constraint in 
Country B is therefore, M
B
 = (pe + tm)e + pcc + p
B
ww
B
.  The representative consumer 
maximizes utility in (5) subject to this budget constraint and the materials balance 
constraint e = w
B
.  The first-order conditions are  
   Lwb: U
B
e = ∂
B
[pe + tm + p
B
w] 
   Lc: U
B
c = ∂
B
[pc], 
which can be simplified to, 
(19)   U
B
e/U
B
c = (pe + tm + p
B
w)/pc. 
 The representative competitive waste disposing firm in Country B no longer 
pays the disposal tax (t
B
w=0), but still charges market prices for disposal.  Condition 
(17) therefore reduces to p
B
w = pk/b’. 
Following the same substitutions patterns described above, the allocation of 
resources as function of tax rates resulting from the competitive equilibrium is 
(20a)  U
A
d/∂
A
 = 1 + f’/g’ + tAw 
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(20b)  U
A
d/∂
A
 = 1 + f’ke - UBef’/U
B
ch’ + f’/b’ + tm 
By comparing (20) to the Pareto Opimal condition in (10), the optimal waste 
tax in County A (t
A
w) is unaffected and still equal to the external cost of disposal.  But 
because County B is unable to assess a waste tax, the import tax is necessary for the 
decentralized economy to achieve the Pareto Optimum.  The optimal import tax is set 
equal to the external marginal cost of waste disposal in Country B, as was the original 
waste tax from the previous section (thus, tm = t
B
w).  Both taxes (tm and t
B
w) increase 
the overall cost of consuming the used durable good to the consumer in Country B.  
The consumer responds to either tax by substituting the non-durable good (c) for the 
used durable good (e) in consumption.  This tax equivalency disappears if consumers 
in Country B face alternatives for disposing waste (currently e = w
B
).  If, for example, 
recycling were an option in Country B, then the waste tax would lead to efficient 
quantities of waste, consumption, and recycling, but the import tax would not lead to an 
inefficient choice between waste and recycling in Country B. 
 
A Subsidy to Waste Returns (t
A
w>0, t
B
w=0, te=0, tr >0) 
Consider an alternative policy approach where absent a disposal tax (t
B
w=0) the 
government in Country B can subsidize the return to Country A of the waste from the 
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used durable good.  Assume a technology is available to utilize the global economic 
resource (k
r
) to transport the waste from the used durable back to Country A for 
disposal, 
(22)   wr = r(k
r) where r’>0. 
The representative consumer in Country B now chooses whether to dispose the waste in 
Country B or return the waste to Country A, e = wB + wr (with wB, wr  0). 
Based upon the materials balance constraints above, the total quantity of waste returned 
to Country A (call it R for the moment) is the total quantity of the used durable good 
exported to Country B (ne) less the total quantity disposed in Country B (mwB).  
Because e = wB + wr, we have R = n(wB + wr) - mwB, which can be simplified to R = 
(n-m)wB + nwr.  The representative consumer in Country A experiences disutility from 
both sources of waste.  Thus,  
(23)  U
A
 = U
A 
(d, nwA + R) = U
A 
(d, nwA + (n-m)wB + nwr), 
All other tastes and technologies in this economy are identical to that modeled above. 
The Pareto Optimal allocation of economic resources is found by maximizing 
the Lagrange function 
L = UA{g(kw) + b(kb) + r(kr), ng(kw) + (n-m)b(kb) + nr(kr)} 
+ 1[
BU - U
B
{h[k - k
d 
- k
w 
- k
e
(b(k
b
) + r(k
r
)) - k
b 
- k
r
], b(k
b
) + r(k
r
), mb(k
b
)}] 
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+ 2[ f(k
d
) - g(k
w
) - b(k
b
) – r(kr)], 
Where BU is a constant and 1 and 2 are Lagrange multipliers.  This function is 
maximized over k
w
, k
b
, k
r
, and k
d
.  The first-order conditions are 
(24a) Lkw: U
A
dg’+ nU
A
wg’ = 1[-U
B
ch’] + 2[g’] 
(24b) Lkb: U
A
db’ + (n-m)U
A
wb’= 1[-U
B
ch’k
e’b’- UBch’+ U
B
eb’+mU
B
wb’] + 2[b’] 
(24c) Lr: U
A
dr’ + nU
A
wr’ = 1 [-U
B
c h’ke’r’ - UBch’ + U
B
er’] + 2[r’] 
(25d) Lkd: 1[U
B
ch’] + 2[f’] = 0 
Divide (24a) by g’, (24b) by b’, (25c) by r’, and solve (24d) for 1 and substitute into 
the three remaining conditions to get 
(25a)  U
A
d/2 + nU
A
w/2 = f’/g’ + 1 
(25b)  U
A
d/2 + (n-m)U
A
w/2 + mU
B
wf’/U
B
ch’ = f’k
e’ + f’/b’ - UBef’/U
B
ch’ + 1 
(25c)  U
A
d/2 + nU
A
w/2 = f’k
e’ + f’/r’ - UBef’/U
B
ch’ + 1 
These three equations summarize the efficient global allocation of the economic 
resource. These conditions will be compared below with those representing a 
competitive economy. 
In a decentralized economy, assume once again that the government of Country 
A can assess a tax on waste disposed in Country A (t
A
w), which would apply to both 
domestic waste and waste returned from Country B for disposal in Country A.  
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Assume the only policy instrument in Country B is a subsidy (s
B
r) paid for the return of 
waste from the used durable goods originally exported from Country A.  Although 
politically problematic, the subsidy could also be offered by the government of Country 
A if Country B lacks the administrative infrastructure to implement such an instrument. 
In Country A, conditions for utility and profit maximization are identical to 
those stated in (11a), (11b), and (12) above.  The waste disposal firm in Country A 
now receives waste from both Country A and Country B.  This firm receives price, 
p
A
w, from consumers in Country A to dispose the durable good and price, pr, from 
consumers in Country B to dispose the returned waste.  The waste firm must pay the 
waste tax on both domestic waste (wA) and waste returned from Country B (wr).  The 
waste firm employs the economic resource to facilitate two disposal technologies ((3) 
and now (22)) to maximize profit, π = (pAw - t
A
w)wA + (pr - t
A
w)wr - pkk
w
 – pkk
r
.  Profit 
is maximized by equating 
(26a)   p
A
w = (pk/g’ + t
A
w) 
(26b)   pr = pk/r’ + t
A
w. 
In Country B, the representative consumer chooses consumption and disposal 
practices to maximize utility (5) subject to the condition that e = wB + wr and the budget 
constraint, M
B
 = pee + pcc + prwr + p
B
ww
B
 - s
B
rwr, where each unit of waste returned to 
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Country A (wr) receives the subsidy.  The first-order conditions for 
utility-maximization are 
(27a)  Lc: U
B
c = δ
B
[pc] 
(27b)  Lwb: U
B
e = δ
B
[pe + p
B
w] 
(27c)  Lwr: U
B
e = δ
B
[pe + pr - s
B
r] 
Other profit-maximizing conditions representing the competitive economy in Country B 
are the same as above ((16) and (17), but with t
B
w = 0). 
Solve for δB in (27a) and substitute into (27b) and (27c).  Then use (16), (17), 
(26b), and (12) to eliminate pc, p
B
w, pr and pk from the remaining two equations.  Then 
use (12) and (26a) to eliminate pk and p
A
w from (11a) and (11b).  (11a) becomes 
(11a’)  UAd/∂
A
 - t
A
w = f’/g’ + 1 
Then solve (11b) for pe and substitute into (27b) and (27c) to eliminate pe.  
The resulting equations are 
(27b’)  UAd/δ
A
 = f’k
e’ + f’/b’ - UBef’/U
B
ch’ + 1 
(27c’)  UAd/δ
A
 + s
B
r - t
A
w = f’k
e’ + f’/r’ - UBef’/U
B
ch’ + 1. 
Equations (11a’), (27b)’ and (27c)’ characterize the allocation of resources in a 
decentralized economy as a function of the waste tax in Country A and the subsidy for 
the return of waste in Country B.  Notice that the right-hand sides of (11a’), (27b’) and 
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(27c’) are equal to those of the Pareto Optimum, (25a), (25b) and (25c).  Combining 
these two sets of three equations to eliminate the identical right-hand sides gives 
(28a)  U
A
d/2 + nU
A
w/2 = U
A
d/δ
A
 - t
A
w 
(28b)   U
A
d/2 + (n-m)U
A
w/2 + mU
B
wf’/U
B
ch’ = U
A
d/δ
A
 
(28c)  U
A
d/2 + nU
A
w/2 = U
A
d/δ
A
 + s
B
r - t
A
w 
Solve (28a) for t
A
w to get 
  t
A*
w = -nU
A
w/2 - U
A
d(1/2 - 1/δ
A
)  
Only if 2 = δ
A
 (these re both Lagrange multipliers) will the waste tax in Country A be 
equal to the baseline case.  Recall that 2 is the marginal utility of the durable good in 
County A and that that δA is the marginal utility of exogenous income in Country A.  
Given that the durable good is the numeraire (with price of 1) and is the only good that 
provides utility to the consumer in Country A, the addition of $1 in income to the 
consumer in County A must provide the equivalent marginal utility as the addition of 
one unit of the durable good.  Thus the marginal utility of income will always equal 
the marginal utility of consuming the durable good, and 2 = δ
A
.  Thus, the tax on 
waste is identical to the baseline case.  Country A taxes waste according to external 
marginal cost of disposal in County A. 
Set (28b) equal to (28c) by eliminating (U
A
d/2 - U
A
d/δ
A
) gives 
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s
B*
r = - mU
B
wf’/U
B
ch’ - (n-m)U
A
w/2 + nU
A
w/2 + t
A*
w 
which, when recalling that f’ = UBch’/δ
B
 (from (14), (16), and (12)) allows the optimal 
subsidy to be simplified to 
s
B*
r = - m(U
B
w/δ
B
 - U
A
w/2) + t
A*
w, 
where t
A*
w is defined as above. 
There are three components to the optimal subsidy. The first we call the 
“Country B Effect”, which suggests the optimal subsidy will reflect the external 
marginal cost of disposal in Country B (-mU
B
w/δ
B
).  The subsidy increases the 
opportunity cost of disposing waste in Country B and therefore causes consumers to 
make efficient disposal decisions.  The “Country A Effect” suggests the optimal 
subsidy should also reflect the external costs of returning waste to Country A (U
A
w/2).  
This effect allows consumers in Country B to internalize the social disposal costs in 
Country A when choosing whether or not to return waste for disposal in Country A.  
The third component allows for perfect netting of the two policies.  As the waste 
passes from the consumer in Country B to the disposal site in Country A, it will 
encounter two policy instruments (s
B*
r and t
A*
w).  This third component suggests that if 
the waste tax changes in Country A, then the subsidy should also change to leave 
constant the overall incentive to return waste to Country A. 
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Thus, two of these three components are based upon the external costs of 
disposal in Country A.  To see this, substitute for t
A*
w to find, 
s
B*
r = - mU
B
w/δ
B
 + (m-n)U
A
w/2. 
As external costs of disposal rise in Country A, the optimal return subsidy falls to 
discourage waste from being returned to Country A (mU
A
w/2) and rises to preserve the 
zero-net-effect of the two policy measures (-nU
A
w/2).  The overall effect on the 
subsidy is positive if n>m and is negative if n<m.  Thus if the population of Country B 
is larger than that of Country A, then the value of the subsidy is inversely related to 
external disposal costs in Country A.  
Consider two interesting special cases.  First, assume disposal technology in 
Country A has advanced to the point that all social costs of waste disposal are 
internalized by consumers paying the price of waste disposal.  Thus, external costs of 
waste disposal are positive only in Country B (U
A
w = 0, U
B
w/δ
B
 > 0).  The optimal 
subsidy reduces to s
B*
r = - mU
B
w/δ
B
.  The subsidy reflects the full external costs of 
disposal in Country B.  This subsidy rate also occurs in the rare event that m = n.  
Second, assume external costs of waste disposal are positive and equal in both countries 
(U
A
w/2 = U
B
w/δ
B
).  In this case s
B*
r = t
A*
w.  The net incentive for returning waste to 
Country A is zero as the consumer receives the subsidy but must pay the equal tax for 
 25 
disposal in Country A.  Once the waste material from the durable good is in Country 
B, society is indifferent between disposal in Country A or Country B. 
Note that both instruments (t
A
w and s
B
r) allow the competitive economy to 
achieve the Pareto Optimal allocation of the economic resource.  The return subsidy by 
itself is unable to achieve the Pareto optimum because it fails to force consumers in 
Country A to internalize the social costs of disposal.  But if administering the return 
subsidy is impossible, then the next section examines the case when the only global 
policy instrument available is a waste tax (t
A
w) in Country A.   
 
5. Only Disposal Tax in Country A (t
A
w>0, t
B
w=0, tm=0, s
B
r=0) 
 Suppose Country B is unable to assess the waste tax or the import tax, perhaps 
due a previous trade agreement.  Mexico, for example, eliminated trade restrictions on 
all 10-15 year-old vehicles in 2005 in accordance with the implementation of NAFTA 
(Davis and Kahn (2008)).  Furthermore, to compare to the baseline case assume the 
technology to return waste to Country A (in 22) is no longer available to the economy.  
The only remaining tax instrument available to the global economy is the disposal tax 
levied on waste disposed in County A. 
The competitive decentralized allocation of the economic resource summarized 
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in (20) is therefore reduced to, 
(29a)  U
A
d/∂
A
 = 1 + f’/g’ + tAw 
(29b)  U
A
d/∂
A
 = 1 + f’ke - UBef’/U
B
ch’ + f’/b’. 
Note the only difference is that the tm variable is now zero. 
Recall that the Pareto Optimal allocation of resources is governed by  
(10). Comparing these two sets of equations suggests the Pareto Optimum can still be 
achieved by the single waste tax when 
  t
A
w = - nU
A
w/2 + mU
B
w/δ
B
. 
The waste tax in County A can be positive or negative depending upon the magnitudes 
of the waste externality in each country.  The waste tax in Country A is negative (a 
subsidy) when - mU
B
w/δ
B
 > - nU
A
w/2, or when the waste disposal externality in 
Country B is larger than in County A.  The waste subsidy serves to internalize to 
consumers in Country A the external costs of disposal in Country B.  Consumers in 
Country A respond to the subsidy by efficiently reducing exports of the used durable 
goods to Country B.  As was the case with the import tax discussed above, the 
efficiency of this waste tax relies upon there being no recycling options in Country B. 
 That an open country should set a waste tax waste above or below the domestic 
external cost of disposal has been found in previous studies, but for other reasons.  
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Krutilla (1991) demonstrates that waste taxes are set above external marginal costs of 
disposal to reduce imports and therefore improve the terms of trade.  Kennedy (1993) 
suggests waste taxes be set below the external marginal cost of waste to subsidize 
domestic industries.  Cassings and Kuhn (2003) suggest waste taxes fall below the 
external marginal cost of waste to compensate for the market distortion caused by 
imperfect competition in the exporting country. 
Consider the interesting case when the external disposal costs are equal across 
the two countries (- mU
B
w/δ
B
 = - nU
A
w/2).  The optimal waste tax in this case is zero.  
The competitive market place void of tax policies in either country results in the 
efficient allocation of the economic resource. 
 A government that disregards the external costs in Country B will set the waste 
tax equal to the external costs in Country A.  This tax will cause consumers in Country 
A to inefficiently increase efforts to export the used durable good to Country B where 
tax policies do not exist.  It is not clear that a government will ease domestic 
environmental policies to improve environmental conditions in other countries, as is 
called for to achieve a global Pareto Optimum. 
 
5. Conclusion  
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This paper developed a model of two countries trading a used durable good for 
global reuse to solve for various tax systems that allow a competitive equilibrium to 
achieve the Pareto Optimal allocation of an economic resource.  If the importing 
country is unable to tax waste according the external marginal cost of disposal, then the 
Pareto Optimum can be achieved by the implementation of an import tax or a subsidy 
paid for the return of the durable good for disposal in the original country.  If the 
importing country is unable to tax imports or subsidize returns, then the Pareto 
Optimum can also be achieved by a single disposal tax in the exporting country.  This 
tax is set below the external marginal cost of disposal in Country A to discourage 
consumers from exporting the used durable good to policy-less Country B. 
Many developing countries that import used durable goods lack waste taxes, 
import taxes, or return subsidies.  The remaining question is why.  The lack of a 
waste could be due to worries over illegal dumping (Copeland, 1991).  The absence of 
import taxes could be due to trade agreements, and the lack of a return subsidy might be 
attributable to the lack of public funds necessary to finance the subsidy.  Lacking these 
policies, an inefficiently high quantity of waste from durable goods is disposed in 
developing countries.  Perhaps the dead weight loss associated with the inefficiently 
high quantity of waste is small when compared to cost of administering a tax.  Or 
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perhaps government agents in developing countries do not internalize the social costs of 
disposal.  Citizens bearing the external costs of disposal are unable to put public 
pressure on government. 
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